Estamos leyendo (18 mayo 2012)

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

1. Sales Prices of Residential Buildings in 70 Medium and Large-sized Cities in April (NBS).
2. China Home Prices Fall in More Than Half Cities Tracked (Bloomberg).
3. Bankia pone fin a diez jornadas consecutivas de castigo en Bolsa (El País).
4. Greece Must Exit (Nouriel Roubini en Project Syndicate).
5. If Greece goes: An exit is likely to shatter faith in the eurozone’s integrity for ever (Martin Wolf en FT).
6. Fitch downgrades Greece, cites euro exit risk (AP).
7. Senate Confirms Fed Board Nominees (NYT).

Solicitudes EE UU sin cambio; mantienen tendencia

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

Las solicitudes iniciales de compensación por desempleo en EE UU se mantuvieron sin cambio en 370 mil la semana pasada. El promedio móvil de 4 meses cayó en 5 mil a 375 mil, su segunda caída consecutiva (DOL). La tendencia a la baja apoya nuestro pronóstico de que la Fed no llevará a cabo más relajamiento cuantitativo en 2012-13.

Moody’s rebaja calificación de 16 bancos españoles

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

La agencia calificadora Moody’s rebajó la calificación de 16 bancos españoles. Los tres más grandes del país, Santander (que también es el más grande de la ZE) BBVA y Caixabank, fueron rebajados tres escalones a A3, seis niveles debajo de la calificación máxima, y cuatro arriba de calificación basura (El País, Reuters, Moody’s vía Reuters). Sin embargo, FT reporta que, a pesar de las degradaciones, el viernes los bancos se estaban recuperando de las caídas del jueves.

El País:

La agencia de calificación de riesgos Moody’s rebajó este jueves nuevamente, en bloque, la calificación de los bancos españoles. En concreto, degradó entre uno y tres escalones la nota de 16 entidades españolas, incluidos el Banco Santander, el BBVA, CaixaBank y Banesto, así como la de la filial del Banco Santander en Reino Unido. Hace dos días la agencia rebajó también la nota a 26 bancos italianos.

Moody’s, a quien algunos acusan, junto con el resto de agencias, de provocar la crisis financiera internacional, utiliza cuatro argumentos principales para la rebaja. En primer lugar, las adversas condiciones operativas, caracterizadas por la recaída en la recesión, la continuación de la crisis inmobiliaria y los niveles de desempleo persistentemente altos. En segundo lugar, la menor solvencia de España, que afecta a la capacidad del Gobierno de apoyar a los bancos. En tercer lugar, el rápido deterioro de la calidad de los activos, con un acelerado aumento de la morosidad de los préstamos del sector inmobiliario y su posible extensión a los créditos de otros sectores. Y, por último, las dificultades de las entidades para acceder a los mercados de financiación mayorista ante las persistentes preocupaciones de los inversores sobre los bancos españoles y la deuda del Estado.

El País provee esta útil tabla para ubicar las diferentes calificaciones y compararlas con las de las otras dos grandes calificadoras:

Texto de la decisión de Moody’s vía Reuters:

Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded by one to three notches the long-term debt and deposit ratings for 16 Spanish banks and Santander UK PLC, a UK-domiciled subsidiary of Banco Santander (Spain) SA. The rating downgrades primarily reflect the concurrent downgrades of most of these banks’ standalone credit assessments, and in five cases also Moody’s assessment that the Spanish government’s ability to provide support to the banks has reduced. The debt and deposit ratings declined by one notch for five banks, by two notches for three banks and by three notches for nine banks. The short-term ratings for 13 banks have also been downgraded between one and two notches, triggered by the long-term ratings changes.

[...]Today’s actions reflect, to various extents across banks, four main drivers: 1.) Adverse operating conditions, characterised by the renewed recession, the ongoing real-estate crisis and persistent high levels of unemployment. 2.) Reduced creditworthiness of the Spanish sovereign, which weighs on banks’ standalone profiles and affects the ability of the government to support banks. 3.) Rapid asset-quality deterioration, with non-performing loans to real-estate companies rising rapidly, and Moody’s expecting other loan categories to deteriorate. 4.) Restricted market funding access, with the ongoing euro area debt crisis contributing to persistent investor concerns about Spanish banks and the sovereign.

[No aparece el texto sobre el primer criterio; se salta al segundo:]

SECOND DRIVER – REDUCED CREDITWORTHINESS OF THE SPANISH SOVEREIGN Amidst the ongoing euro area debt crisis, the Spanish government’s rising budget deficit and the renewed recession, sovereign creditworthiness has declined. This decline is a driver of today’s bank rating actions, and it is reflected in the recent two-notch downgrade of the government bond rating to A3, with a negative outlook (see 13 February 2012 press release “Moody’s adjusts ratings of 9 European sovereigns to capture downside risks”:). Moody’s says that the standalone credit strength of many Spanish banks has weakened, as they are linked in multiple ways to the sovereign. These linkages include (i) the impact of the government’s financial position on the domestic economy; and (ii) the large exposures of most banks to their domestic government and to other counterparties who depend on the government. Reduced government creditworthiness also affects the ability of the government to support banks, as discussed under “Ratings Rationale – Senior Debt and Deposit Ratings” below.

THIRD DRIVER – RAPID ASSET-QUALITY DETERIORATION Another factor underpinning today’s rating actions is the sharp increase of problem loans already observed and Moody’s view that loan delinquencies will continue to rise in coming quarters. The rating agency bases this view partly on the very weak performance of loans to companies in the real-estate and construction sectors, which accounted for 23% of Spanish banks’ lending to the private sector at year-end 2011. Moreover, Moody’s expects the recession and very high unemployment to cause asset-quality deterioration also for loans to households and non-real-estate-related businesses. These loan categories have shown only moderate weakening to date. Accelerating problem loans in the real-estate sector have already driven total domestic non-performing loans of the Spanish banking system to 8.2% of total loans at the end of February 2012, up from less than 1% at year-end 2007 (source: Bank of Spain). Moody’s notes that the amount of non-paying assets is even higher, if real estate acquired as payment-in-kind from troubled borrowers is included.

FOURTH DRIVER – RESTRICTED MARKET FUNDING ACCESS Contributing to today’s rating actions, Spanish banks are facing less cost-effective, volatile and at times restricted access to wholesale funding markets. Moody’s recognises that Spanish banks on average funded 46% of total assets with deposits at year-end 2011 (source: ECB), a high level compared with other Western European banking systems. Nonetheless, banks rely to varying degrees on market funds, leaving most susceptible to the persistent market tensions. Partly due to market tensions, Spanish banks have increased their ECB borrowings by more than six times since June 2011, to the highest level in absolute terms among euro area banking systems as of April 2012. The availability of three-year funds from the ECB has mitigated near-term funding stress. However, significant central bank reliance raises the issue of how Spanish banks will be able to reduce their ECB funding reliance over time. Whilst Spanish banks have deleveraged in 2011 by not fully renewing maturing loans, the scope for further deleveraging is unclear.

RATINGS RATIONALE – SENIOR DEBT AND DEPOSIT RATINGS

ACTIONS FOLLOW REVIEW ANNOUNCEMENTS ON 15 FEBRUARY 2012 AND OTHER DATES Today’s rating actions follow Moody’s decision to review for downgrade the ratings for many European financial institutions, including Spanish banks, see “Moody’s reviews ratings for European Banks”, 15 February 2012 (). On 7 May 2012, Moody’s extended the review for Santander to its short-term ratings (see “Announcement: Moody’s extends Santander’s current ratings review to include its short-term ratings” (). Moody’s previously placed several Spanish bank ratings on review on 12 December 2011, see “Rating Action: Moody’s reviews Spanish banks’ ratings for downgrade; removes systemic support for subordinated debt” (); “Announcement: Moody’s reviews Banco Popular’s ratings for downgrade and ratings of Banco Pastor for upgrade (Spain)”, 10 October 2011 (); “Announcement: Moody’s reviews Unicaja’s ratings for downgrade and Caja España’s ratings for upgrade following merger agreement”, 27 September 2011 ().

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN Moody’s believes that rating upgrades are unlikely in the near future for banks affected by today’s actions, for the reasons given above. Whilst the current rating levels and outlooks incorporate a degree of expected further deterioration, the rating agency is of the opinion that the banks’ ratings may decline further if (i) operating conditions worsen beyond Moody’s current expectations; (ii) the Spanish sovereign’s creditworthiness declines further; (iii) asset-quality deterioration exceeds Moody’s current expectations; and (iv) pressures from market-funding restrictions intensify. However, Moody’s believes that a limited amount of upward rating momentum could develop if the banks substantially improve their credit profiles and resilience to the prevailing conditions. This may occur through increased standalone strength, for example as a result of bolstered capital and liquidity buffers, work-out of asset-quality challenges, improved earnings or improved funding conditions. Ratings could also benefit from increased external support.

(El texto continúa con el detalle de la rebaja para cada banco.)

México: creación de empleos en sector formal se acelera en T1; tasa de desempleo sin cambio

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

En el primer trimestre de 2012, la tasa de desempleo (desestacionalizada) en México se mantuvo igual que en el trimestre anterior (5.0%), la creación de empleos formales se aceleró por tercer trimestre consecutivo a 2.9% interanual (2.5% en T4), y la creación de empleos totales se desaceleró a 3.8% (5.5% en T4). Otra medida de creación de empleos formales, los trabajadores cotizados en el IMSS, muestra un ritmo estable de creación de empleos: 4.6% interanual en abril (igual que en marzo) (Inegi, IMSS).

La proporción de trabajadores ocupados en el sector informal cayó ligeramente a 29.1% desde 29.2% en T4 2011.

La tasa de participación laboral (sd) cayó 0.3 puntos porcentuales a 59.0% en T1. El promedio histórico (desde T2 2000) es de 58.1%.

Recuerde que hay diferencia entre los empleos formales –cuando los trabajadores se han dado de alta en el IMSS– y los empleos en el sector formal –aquellos cuyos empleadores están dadas de alta ante Hacienda, pero cuyos trabajadores tal vez no están dados de alta en el IMSS.

Se cierra la brecha del producto en EE UU

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

El porcentaje de capacidad utilizada de la industria estadounidense se recuperó en abril (79.2%), después de haber caído en marzo (a 78.4%). Se acerca lentamente al promedio histórico anterior a la crisis (80.9% entre 1986 y 2006) (Fed).

Tasa de desempleo sugiere que Reino Unido comienza a desacoplarse de ZE

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

La tasa de desempleo de Reino Unido se redujo a 8.2% desde 8.3% en febrero, mientras que la tasa de participación laboral aumentó 0.1 puntos a 63.2% (igual al promedio desde 2000). En Corea, la tasa de desempleo se mantuvo sin cambio en 3.4% (ONS, Kostat).

Banca griega tiene pleno acceso a liquidez de su banco central

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

Un artículo en Reuters sembró miedo en los mercados el miércoles al afirmar que el Banco Central Europeo (BCE) había dejado de ofrecer liquidez a algunos bancos griegos que no considera solventes. Al mismo tiempo, WSJ y otros reportaban que se están retirando depósitos de bancos griegos a un ritmo acelerado.

Dos blogs de Financial Times, Money Supply y Alphaville, aclaran la situación. Hay que tener presentes dos cosas: primero, la razón por la que se detuvo la provisión de liquidez es técnica y probablemente será revertida pronto. Segundo, los bancos afectados pueden mientras tanto obtener liquidez del banco central de Grecia.

Joseph Cotterill en Alphaville:

The flash of that Reuters story did spook markets. It seems to have been taken as a signal that the ECB was pausing all liquidity ops to some Greek banks.

It. Really. Is. Not.

This seems to be because not many get how ELA works.

It’s a silly dispute between the central bank and the EFSF about releasing EFSF bonds to some Greek banks as recapitalisation instruments. The bonds have been earmarked for release under the second bailout in a few tranches, and will eventually total €48bn.

Once they get the bonds, the banks can pledge them as collateral within normal ECB liquidity ops. ‘Monetary policy operations’ in the Reuters story above means things like the ECB’s MRO. Normal liquidity ops have certain thresholds for accepting collateral.

But there’s been a delay. A dumb, technical, one.

[...] That’s why the funding that some Greek banks could have got from pledging these bonds to the normal ECB, shifts to ELA conducted by the Greek central bank.

[...]ELA has fewer collateral requirements. It’s comparable to a fail-over mechanism in the way it works here. The sum of Greek central bank ELA increases only to the extent of the sum of liquidity Greek banks could otherwise have got from the ECB. It’s a pretty specific swap of liquidity, but in any case, the Greek banks on the receiving end get… liquidity.

Also, we should make it clear that not all the ECB normal liquidity being supplied to Greek banks has been put on pause. 1.  There are more assets in their collateral pools that they can pledge to the ECB. Similarly, they have €65bn of collateral for use under ELA.

Claire Jones en Money Supply:

What’s the difference between ELA and accessing ECB cash?

For the banks, the terms of the loans. Under ELA, the Greek central bank, rather than the Eurosystem – which includes the ECB and the other national central banks, can set the collateral requirements.  This means that poorer quality assets could be accepted by the Greek central bank in exchange for euros.

For the central banks, the difference is that with ELA, the national central bank is on the hook for any losses. With ECB loans, any losses would be shared.

ELA is usually approved by the ECB’s governing council, made up of the heads of the national central banks and the ECB’s executive board. However, below a certain threshold, ELA does not require approval of the governing council and can be made at the discretion of the national central banks.

Greek banks have already been reliant on ELA for a while now.

Algunos pasajes del artículo de Reuters:

The European Central Bank has stopped providing liquidity to some Greek banks as they have not been successfully recapitalised, the ECB said on Wednesday, confirming news earlier reported exclusively by Reuters.

… “As recapitalisation wasn’t in place, the ECB stopped monetary policy operations,” a euro zone central bank source told Reuters, declining to be identified. “They are now in the ELA of the Greek central bank.”

An ECB official later added: “Pending the recapitalisation of Greek banks that are severely undercapitalised as a result of the recent PSI (debt restructuring) operation, some of the Greek banks have been moved to Emergency Liquidity Assistance.”

“Once the recapitalisation process is finalised, and we expect this to be finalised soon, the banks will regain access to standard Eurosystem refinancing operations,” the official added. “The ECB/Eurosystem (of euro zone central banks) continues to support Greek banks.”

It was unclear exactly how many lenders were affected but the development marked a increase in the number of Greek banks depending on emergency borrowing from the Bank of Greece.

One person familiar with the matter said four Greek banks’ capital was so depleted they were operating with negative equity capital. According to its own rules, the ECB cannot provide liquidity to banks in such a situation.

Proyección Banco de Inglaterra sugiere que podría haber más QE

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

El Banco de Inglaterra publicó su informe trimestral de inflación (página del informe, informe completo en PDF). Claire Jones en Money Supply (de FT) reporta que las proyecciones del banco central para el corto plazo son de mayor inflación y menor crecimiento de lo que se proyectaba antes, pero que a mediano plazo no han cambiado mucho. También interpreta que es enteramente posible que haya otra ronda de relajamiento cuantitativo, dado que la proyección de inflación a dos años está ligeramente por debajo de 2.0%.

Palabras introductorias del gobernador Mervyn King antes de conferencia de prensa.

Las conclusiones principales del informe y de la conferencia de prensa, según Claire Jones:

Growth is lower, and inflation higher, in the short term, but “the big picture” on the UK economy remains the same. The governor acknowledged, however, that the UK’s productivity problems may be more persistent than previously thought, which is significant given that this would lessen the amount of growth the economy can tolerate without higher inflation.

More QE is a possibility given that the central forecasts show inflation edging below 2 per cent two years from now. It would appear that further asset purchases (and more liquidity) are pretty much a certainty if the eurozone crisis worsens.

The Bank is not too concerned about the recent appreciation of the pound. Not yet anyway.

The governor was unwilling to opine on fiscal policy.

Las proyecciones de inflación (nótese que el punto medio de los pronósticos está justo por debajo de la meta de 2%):

Inflación subyacente de EE UU refuerza nuestra perspectiva: no habrá QE3 en 2012-13

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

La tasa de inflación de EE UU cayó a 2.3% en abril desde 2.7% en marzo. La tasa de inflación subyacente aumentó a 2.3% desde 2.2% (BLS). Tal incremento refuerza nuestra perspectiva para la política monetaria de la Fed: no habrá otra ronda de QE en 2012 o 2013. (Dicha opinión descansa en el crucial y ahora frágil supuesto de que Grecia no se saldrá de la unión monetaria europea durante el horizonte de pronóstico.)

El subíndice de autos usados subió en un veloz 3.5%. El de ropa 5.1%, pese a la fuerza del dólar (la mayoría de la ropa en EE UU es importada).

La tasa de inflación general ha caído o permanecido constante todos los meses desde septiembre 2011.

La inflación general y tres subíndices fundamentales:

• General: –0.4 puntos porcentuales a 2.3%, séptimo mes sin cambio o cayendo.
• Subyacente: sin cambio en 2.3%, segundo mes sin cambio o subiendo.
• Alimentos: –0.2 a 3.1%, cuarto mes que cae.
• Energía: –3.7 a 0.9%, segundo mes que cae.

Inflación subyacente terca en ZE confirma nuestro pronóstico para tasa BCE: sin cambio hasta octubre

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

La tasa de inflación de abril en la zona del euro fue confirmada en 2.6% interanual, ligeramente debajo del 2.7% de marzo. La tasa de inflación subyacente permaneció sin cambio en abril en 1.9% (ha estado entre 1.9% y 2.0% desde septiembre). No subió en ninguno de los cuatro países más grandes de la zona (Eurostat). Mantenemos nuestro pronóstico de que el BCE no recortará la tasa de política monetaria antes de octubre 2012.

Las caídas en los precios de energéticos son positivas tanto para la demanda como para la oferta. Inercia en la tasa de inflación subyacente es positivo para desinflar el valor real de la deuda soberana pero puede desanimar al BCE a cortar su tasa de interés. Mantenemos nuestro pronóstico de que el BCE no recortará la tasa de política monetaria del BCE antes de octubre 2012.

Tasas de inflación general y subyacente por país:

• ZE: –0.1 puntos porcentuales a 2.6% (subyacente: sin cambio en 1.9%).
• Alemania: –0.1 a 2.2% (subyacente: sin cambio en 1.7%).
• Francia: –0.2 a 2.4% (subyacente: –0.2 a 1.9%).
• Italia: –0.1 a 3.7% (subyacente: –0.2 a 2.6%).
• España: +0.2 a 2.0% (subyacente: sin cambio en 1.1%).
• Irlanda: –0.3 a 1.9% (subyacente: –0.6 a 0.8%).
• Portugal: –0.2 a 2.9% (subyacente: –0.2 a 1.7%).
• Grecia: +0.1 a 1.5% (subyacente: +0.4 a 0.7%).